'My secret wish is to become a Naxal'

Fearless crusader. Super-sleuth. Bestselling author. Angry old man. Popular Sify columnist.

Former Intelligence Bureau joint director Maloy Krishna Dhar is all that, and much much more.

Dhar, who joined the IPS after a brief stint with journalism in Kolkata, was seconded to the Intelligence Bureau in 1964, retiring as joint director in 1996 after many years in the northeast, Kashmir, Punjab, and of course New Delhi. Subsequently, renouncing his political aspirations in disgust after a year with the Congress Party, he took up his pen with a vengeance.

Probably privy to more national secrets than many Prime Ministers ever were or are, Dhar’s latest offering, We the People of India-A Story of Gangland Democracy, (Excerpts) is a very thinly veiled –and shocking--expose of how our politicians are using democracy to gangrape our nation.

Published despite terrible threats and plaintive pleas from powerful people, the book is a scathing indictment of the Indian political system, with skeletons tumbling out of each page.

In an exclusive interview with Ramananda Sengupta, he explains how the book was conceived, and how ‘Our combined will to enforce change can send the mafia, dynastic and corporate political leaders to the dungeon they deserve.’

You have earlier written some bestsellers on the state of India's intelligence and other related issues. But what was the driving force behind your writing this particular book?

The driving force was the same that pushed me to write-Open Secrets-India’s Intelligence Unveiled. In Open Secrets I did not have the scope, space and legal shield to write about the Great Indian Fraud called Electoral Democracy, which is made and unmade by money, muscle and mafia. There were problems about opening secrets about personalities in power. You often get run over by a tanker or get shot.

I was pasted with four contempt notices and two direct “feelers” from Agencies after Open Secrets was published. I spent six months in courts to overcome the petitions and deflect the “feelers” to withdraw the book.

Therefore, to present the people of India a mirror to have a deep look into the system they are living in and the personalities who govern them, I wrote We the People of India-A Story of Gangland Democracy, as a thinly veiled novel. One should read it in continuation of Open Secrets. That will give a complete picture what our political and bureaucratic class are doing to our beloved country.

How to win a Bihar election | The technology of an election | About the author: My friend Maloy! | Read all Maloy Dhar columns

You have reportedly used some rather obvious 'fig leafs’ while describing some home truths about the Indian political system. Were you nervous about the fallout?

No, I was not nervous. I was aware of the legal issues when writing about “happening history”, existing “constitutional institutions”, and “reigning personalities.” If a discerning reader has any sense of current history he/she can have a clear glimpse into the personal lives, their political meanness and siphoning of national wealth to foreign accounts. Besides the criminal cases I was more scared about the bullets-which killed the hero of the story at the end of the new Mahabharat, that is We the People of India…

Could you recount some interesting anecdotes or feedback in response to this book post its publication?

It is a problem question. Before the book was released by George Fernandes (Congress, BJP, Left leaders declined) two officers of an Agency accosted my publisher and obtained two copies. I was later contacted by a former colleague to say that the reigning deities were very unhappy with the book as it contained direct personal attacks against them. My answer was: “They are welcome to move the courts. They did not and adopted a policy of ‘conspiracy of silence.” However, a Bihar stalwart had conveyed that all sins are rewarded with punishment. I am waiting for that.

Without violating your Oath of Secrecy and the Officials Secrets Act, could you tell us what you consider your most memorable achievement during your tenure as Joint Director of our Intelligence Bureau?

The most memorable incident happened at a remote village Soraphung on Manipur (Ukhrul) and Nagaland border (Jessami). Travelling with my wife and son (1971) in a jeep we were stranded as the vehicle had broke down. Some Naga Army (underground) unit wanted to attack and take us as prisoners. A Christian village belle and her teacher husband mobilsed the entire village, gave us shelter for the night and saw us off to the safety of Assam Rifles camp at Jessami, in Chakesang country. We developed lasting relationship with that noble lady. Incidentally the Gaonbura of Soraphung had adopted me as his son. Officially I can claim to be a Naga.

Your association with the bureau must have exposed you to a lot of political and other national secrets. Would you subscribe to the US system which insists on declassifying such secrets after a certain period, say 50 years? Or should some secrets be buried forever?

Yes. I would opt for the US system, minus names, details and operational secrets of the Intelligence Agencies. Revelation of any secret that jeopardise internal security and relationship with geopolitically connected countries should not be disclosed without proper editing. These are matter of tradecraft trust and war and peace.

Your former colleagues in the bureau insist that you were never scared of anything. What gave/gives you that kind of courage?

I migrated through bloodbath; I have struggled immensely after my father’s premature death. I have seen my father, a kind of revolutionary, not being afraid of anything, but dishonour from his own people. He had taught me to look into the eyes of death and say: you are not the end of life. Even at this age my secret wish is to become a Naxal and fight for change.

One of your enduring themes in your books-- like Open Secrets and others --has been accountability. Do you seriously believe that we, the people of India, are ready for that kind of accountability?

Dear friend. If our people do not know the meaning of “accountability, “conflict of interest” and “constitutional systems operations” they deserve living under Mugabe or Musaharraf. Why do they need a democracy? The people should forget the legacies of thousands of years of indigenous feudalism, 800 years of Muslim tyranny and 190 years of British exploitation. If they have to enjoy the fruits of liberty, equality and fraternity they should demand and rise in peaceful revolt for enforcement of “accountability at all levels” and “implementation of the concept of conflict of interest” in every sphere of national activity. It is time, our countrymen, to wake up from Rip Van Winkle’s dream journey.

On a personal note, how did the constant transfers and movement during your long stint with the bureau affect your family life?

I would have been ruined if I did not have a wonderful wife of excellent understanding, who was my life-ling love, my children’s mother, my secretary, and my companion even to the most dangerous areas in the North East, Punjab and Kashmir. She was the anchor. I know very little how our children grew up and did so well in life.

Coming back to your book, do you think dynastic rule is here to stay?

Regretfully, Yes. It is for the people of India to opt for a System Change. My book is all about that-in a rather revolutionary way; written under the philosophic context of the Gita and the Mahabharata.

If you had the power, what would be the first thing you would change in the political system as it exists in India? Something practical and doable, as opposed to just idealistic?

The first and foremost thing is: total overhauling of the “electoral practices.” It is the mother of most corrupt practices and resultant rot in the entire System. It is possible, if the mandate to run the country by the present breed of political class is handed over to a person—say of the honest colour of APJ Abdul Kalam and he is backed by the Higher judiciary and the strongest spine of the nation—the armed forces and the “People”. I cannot imagine ever walking into the shoes of Mr Kalam. But I have the courage and vision. I can be the small squirrel that also threw pebbles to make the Ram Setu to materialse. All of us count with our small stature and intense will. Our combined will to enforce change can send the mafia, dynastic and corporate political leaders to the dungeon they deserve. I wait for the day when this Windsor Democracy turned to Dynastic Democracy would be challenged by the People- by whichever means possible.

The Guerrilla in Colombia

An Interview with Rodrigo Granda, Member of the FARC-EP International Commission

Rodrigo Granda is a member of and the leading international spokesperson for the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC–EP). His name gained global prominence in December 2004 when he was kidnapped in Venezuela and handed over to Colombian authorities by a number of Venezuelan National Guard soldiers seeking a reward placed on his head by the Colombian government. At the time of his capture Granda was attending a meeting of the Bolivarian Peoples Movements in Caracas. Granda’s kidnapping in Venezuela at the instigation of the Colombian government created an international dispute between Venezuela and Colombia. He was released in 2007 in response to pressures exerted on the Colombian government by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

The FARC–EP describes itself as a Marxist revolutionary people’s movement and has been in an armed conflict with the Colombian regime since 1964. It is the largest revolutionary force in the country (the other guerilla group is the smaller ELN or National Liberation Army). At any given time it controls much of the country, although the mainly rural regions under its control vary. In 1984 the FARC–EP agreed to a truce and formed an organized political wing called the Patriotic Union (UP), which was to engage in electoral politics. The UP received such widespread support that the Colombian ruling class panicked and unleashed its death squads, assassinating thousands of UP members and drowning the truce in blood.

Today Columbia is ruled by what has been called a “genocidal democracy” (see Javier Giraldo, Columbia: The Genocidal Democracy, Common Courage, 1996). “The richest 1 percent of the population controls 45 percent of the wealth, while half of the farmland is held by thirty-seven large landholders.” The majority of the population subsists on less than 3 percent of the arable land, while 3 percent owns more than 70 percent of that land (James J. Brittain, “The FARC–EP in Colombia,” Monthly Review, September 2005). Columbia is the dominant source of cocaine in the world. Large parts of the country are dominated by drug lords with their paramilitary armies with which the government is closely associated. Columbian President Álvaro Uribe is himself linked to drug traffickers, including members of his own family.

In the 1990s under the Clinton administration “Plan Colombia” was introduced whereby the United States provided massive military aid and direct “special operations” support to Colombia aimed at the FARC–EP, under the cover of an anti-narcotics operation. During the Bush administration, Washington replaced this with “Plan Patriota,” carried out in cooperation with Uribe’s government, under the rubric of which the United States has intensified its war on the FARC–EP as part of the so-called War on Terrorism. In 2001–02 the United States, followed by its allies in the European Union, officially designated the FARC–EP as a “terrorist” organization. However, the dominant reality in Colombia is state/paramilitary terrorism. As part of the stepped-up repressive campaign in the Bush/Uribe period the paramilitaries in league with the Columbian military forces committed atrocities such as burning children alive and using chainsaws on others while still alive (see James J. Brittain, “Run, Fight or Die in Colombia: The Paramilitaries Burned Wayuu Children Alive and Killed Others with Chainsaws,” Counterpunch, March 12–13, 2005, http://www.counterpunch.org/brittain03122005.html). Meanwhile, Bogotá and Washington continue to use chemical fumigants on large parts of the country, ostensibly aimed at coca eradication, but also as a form of chemical warfare.

An issue of growing international concern has been the humanitarian exchange of prisoners/hostages taken by the two sides in the war. In June 2007, during negotiations on the release of twelve Colombian lawmakers held by the FARC–EP, a counterinsurgency attack on the FARC–EP encampment where these prisoners were being held was carried out and eleven of the lawmakers were killed in the crossfire. The FARC–EP was accused by Bogotá and Washington of having “murdered” the captives although evidence on the ground seemed to confirm the FARC–EP’s story that the death of the prisoners was unintended (see Inter Press Service News Agency, “Columbia: Pawns of War—The Hostage Crisis,” November 2, 2007, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp
?idnews=39902).

In fall 2007 Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez became increasingly active in negotiations for the release of FARC–EP captives, bringing in a number of important international figures to support the effort, such as U.S. filmmaker Oliver Stone. This led eventually to the release in January 2008 of two high-level prisoners held by FARC–EP. Chávez followed up his success in this regard with a demand that the FARC–EP (and also the smaller ELN) be designated as a “real army” with political objectives and not a “terrorist” organization; that it be accorded “belligerent status” in international law. This would then facilitate further releases of prisoners on both sides. His call was supported by the Venezuelan Assembly and Ecuador but rejected by the United States, the Colombian government, and the European Union. The according of belligerent status to the FARC–EP would mean that both the Colombian military and the FARC–EP would have to conform to the Geneva Conventions on warfare and the treatment of prisoners. It would also result in increased pressure for peace negotiations on both sides. Both Washington and Bogotá are therefore adamantly opposed to any such change in the international designation of the FARC–EP as a “terrorist” organization.—Ed.

Jean Batou: The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC–EP) looks upon itself as a politico-military movement waging a social/insurrectional war against the Colombian state. As such, the FARC–EP takes prisoner police officers, soldiers, officials, and mercenaries. The FARC–EP has also decided to kidnap civilians representing the Colombian state apparatus. In short, it also kidnaps civilians, the release of whom depends upon payment of a ransom. While no one can argue with an army taking its armed adversaries prisoner, how can the FARC–EP justify taking civilians captive? Does the FARC–EP not realize that such practices tend to isolate it from broad swathes of antigovernment public opinion in Colombia?

Rodrigo Granda: The FARC–EP is indeed a politico-military movement making use of the inalienable right to rebel against a state that practices paper democracy. What we are doing is responding to a war imposed on us from the highest echelons of power in Colombia. State terrorism has been wielded against us and our people as a method of extermination for decades.

Of course, it is common knowledge, that war of this kind needs funding. This war was forced on us by Colombia’s rich, so they are the ones that have to finance the war they unleashed. That’s why the FARC–EP holds people for whom a monetary payment is collected, which is really a tax. This money is set aside to maintain the apparatus of the people’s war.

As you may know, we talk about constructing a new power, a new state. If in Switzerland, France, or the United States someone ducks out of their duty of paying taxes, then that person has to go to jail. The new state we are shaping has fixed the payment of a peace tax. That means that any individual or corporate body, and any foreign companies operating in Colombia and making profits of over a million dollars a year, have to pay a peace tax equivalent to 10 percent of these profits. Debtors are told they have to enter into dialogue with those who manage the FARC–EP’s finances to pay this sum. If they fail to do so, of course, these people will be arrested and taken to prison until they pay and fulfill their obligations toward those of us who are shouldering the responsibility of the new state, constructed and led by the FARC–EP, acting as the People’s Army.

Now, within the context of military operations some officers, noncommissioned officers, policemen, and soldiers do fall into the hands of the FARC–EP and some are currently being held as prisoners of war. Likewise, during our confrontations with the Colombian state some prisoners from our side have fallen into enemy hands and, following summary rigged trials, they are now serving extremely long sentences in different jails across the country. Unfortunately, this is par for the course during a war. At any rate, amid the extremely acute conflict taking place in Colombia it is possible that some detentions might not, on the whole, be looked upon by the population in a favorable light. But we believe that, by making Law 002 public, according to which certain economically powerful individuals and entities have to pay a peace tax, we have already given them warning and they also have the option to discuss and resolve their situation and to settle up within the time period set. If we can ensure this is complied with then the number of detentions will certainly tail off as a result.

As for whether this divides us from the civil population...it may have some effect on that, but it probably is not crucial, because large sectors of the Colombian population are fully aware that, in general, the FARC–EP only arrests people whose economic situation is pretty comfortable. There is no way this is about arresting people for the sake of arresting them.

Prisoners of war are kept for the purposes of humanitarian trade-offs, which we are hoping to carry out very soon. Let’s not forget that in Colombia the public prosecutor’s office and the specialist judges impose heavy sentences on many guerrilla fighters (who are lucky enough not to have been killed during their capture), sentences that will keep them in prison practically for life, because justice in Colombia is class justice and is applied as such. And, obviously, those of us who make use of the inalienable right of rebellion are labeled “terrorists” or “kidnappers.” You should know that the sentences dished out to revolutionaries range between forty and eighty years.

So you can see that this matter of the tax is a need determined by the current war situation affecting Colombia. We would like it if we did not have to detain anyone, no civilians or oligarchs, not to mention the military....But the confrontation, the daily reality in Colombia, means that this is how things happen—not the way we’d like them to.

JB: The armed struggle is largely funded by the collection of the revolutionary tax on coca leaf cultivation and cocaine base production—and also, to some extent, on ransom payments from kidnappings. If a peace process is initiated, could the guerrilla movement stop using these sources of funding without jeopardizing its politico-organizational autonomy? In other words, are there not certain forces within your movement that are attempting to defend the status quo for fear that demobilization might deprive the FARC–EP of these decisive sources of funding and that this might lead to its isolation?

RG: The first thing that has to be said is that the FARC–EP has always been an autarkic movement, that is to say, it has always operated using its own means and has never depended, either in the past or at present, and will never depend, on any funding of a foreign nature. As the FARC–EP, we were able to develop a subsistence economy initially and then factors of production that have enabled us to keep the movement going.

The FARC–EP existed long before either drug trafficking in Colombia developed or a logistical policy for the systematic detention of persons was implemented. These were by-products of the general situation in the country.

Over the years the FARC–EP has diversified its financing through all kinds of investments: in high finance at home and abroad, and in agricultural production, cattle raising, mining, transport, construction, and many other productive investments.

Now, there is no doubt that the face of Colombia was transformed by the neoliberal policies imposed through terror that ruined the countryside forcing thousands of poor peasant families to survive by producing for this economy so as not to starve to death as a result of the devastation caused to their traditional crops of coffee, corn, banana, sorghum, cotton, and so on.

The FARC–EP is chiefly a rural movement and we are in direct contact with that reality, but we have no authority to force people to abandon so-called illicit crops without giving them an alternative.

At the talks in the Cagúan region (1999–2002) during the government of President Pastrana, the First International Public Audience on the replacement of so-called illicit crops and protection of the environment was held under the initiative of our guerrilla organization. The meeting was attended by the EU, Japan, Canada, the UN, and the International Group of Friends of the Peace Process in Colombia. The United States was invited but did not take part.

At these talks, the FARC–EP presented a viable project for eradicating coca leaf plantations in the municipality of Cartagena del Chairá in the Caquetá Department, of which there were around 8,000 hectares at that time.

We wanted the international community to commit to an alternative to repression and to promote social investment in the area so as to create an “experimental laboratory” there, in the search for ways to eradicate those crops, and then extend the experiment to other regions of Colombia and possibly the continent: Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. This proposal is still valid.

At the same time, we believe that legalization of the drug will help to solve the problem. Economists such as [Milton] Friedman and reputable journals like the Economist acknowledge that this is the case. There is a reason for this: as it is a clandestine business, profitability due to capital turnover is staggering. It is currently estimated that there are $680 billion circulating in the world as a result of drug trafficking and there is no crime people would not commit to get their hands on such an enormous sum of money.

First and foremost it is an economic problem, then a political, and of course, an ethical and moral one, but if the huge profits are eliminated, then the fundamental incentive, which is the return on investment, will be cancelled out and the states will be able to control the market. This would be something like what happened, allowing for differences, with the legalization of whisky...in the United States.

What must be made clear, and we have demonstrated this to the national and international community, is that there is no way the FARC–EP is a drug trafficker, not by any stretch of the imagination. We are not involved in the production, transport, commercialization, or exportation of narcotics. On the contrary, the FARC–EP is willing to work with the international community and with the U.S. government itself to solve this serious problem plaguing the world.

Our organization has implemented the collection of a tax on coca paste buyers who have to enter the areas where these crops are grown and we operate. This payment is collected as a way of controlling the abuses committed against the peasant growers. Of course, we act as policemen. It is the Colombian state that must control this area, but, up until now, it has been incapable of doing so, in spite of the billions of dollars poured in by the U.S. government to put an end to this business.

It is also important to bear in mind that the money provided by this tax is a tiny quantity in relation to the costs of the FARC–EP military apparatus. As for the arrests, it has to be said that this income also helps with the economic maintenance of the FARC–EP, but it is not the most crucial part.

The FARC–EP’s ultimate aim is not to “line the pockets” of its directive personnel, its hierarchy, or its combatants. For us money is a means, something that can help us attain the strategic political end of the FARC–EP, which is to take power in order to bring about political, economic, social, and ecological changes of all kinds that Colombia needs and is demanding. So, the financing is just a means to achieve these ends. Nobody in the FARC–EP aspires to become a millionaire. This is the big difference between us and the drug barons and paramilitaries who are seeking personal gain and want to live “the high life.”

With respect to what you say about a possible demobilization, that is not in the FARC–EP’s immediate plans. I mean, there is not even any contact with Uribe’s government. In the hypothetical case that the war was stopped and other action embarked upon, the FARC–EP has its “plan B.” But we’re talking about hypotheses; the reality is quite different.

However, the FARC–EP is not at war just for the sake of it. We have said that if the political environment changes and the conditions exist for engaging in open, legal politics without fear of reprisals or of being killed; if the door to real democracy is opened, then we could think about changing the form of military confrontation in response to whatever situation was instituted. It has fallen to the FARC–EP throughout the period of Uribe, and before, to act as the political opposition and the armed opposition to the regime because there has been no other way we could express our thinking. The Colombian bourgeoisie is a bloodthirsty, reactionary bourgeoisie that only understands the language of arms. If we had not responded to the aggression, they would already have branded us with red hot iron, and chained us up, like in the age of slavery.

JB: The recent mass mobilizations against the violence and kidnappings have pointed the finger of blame at both the government and the insurgents. Don’t these mobilizations represent a setback for the left in that Álvaro Uribe has been able to use them to his advantage to divert public attention from his involvement in parapolitical scandals?

RG: The mobilizations, as you yourself say, express a repudiation of violence and particularly official and paramilitary violence. The Colombian people are certainly showing signs of fatigue over the military-type confrontation, but what people wouldn’t after forty years of war imposed by the regime?

Álvaro Uribe tried to capitalize on a movement that incorporated popular sectors very close to the FARC–EP, and even members of our guerrilla organization. There, at these mobilizations, you could see the banners demanding a humanitarian exchange, in the search for dialogue toward a political solution to the social and armed conflict in Colombia. If you analyze the press releases, and radio and television reports, you will find that Colombia’s most prestigious commentators criticized the government’s political opportunism. You have to remember that there was even a public confrontation between the interior minister and one of the relatives of the eleven congressional representatives killed in the failed military rescue attempt ordered by the government on June 18 this year. And then the claim that President Uribe has capitalized on the mobilizations is untrue. On the contrary, in the latest opinion polls following those events Uribe’s image is shown to have been tarnished and his popularity is in “free fall” for the first time since he took office.

As for the problem of parapolitics, this is something that has been denounced for over twenty years by the newspaper Voz, the organ of the Communist Party of Colombia, by the FARC–EP, and by democratic friends throughout the country. However the Colombian state has always ignored these denunciations.

A year and a half ago I had the opportunity to talk to the peace commissioner of Uribe’s government, Dr. Luis Carlos Restrepo, at the Cómbita high-security prison, where I was being held hostage. During our conversation, we touched on various topics and I was able to demonstrate to him that the policy of “democratic security” imposed by the president and the “Plan Colombia” had failed. He said to me, “Look, Señor Granda, the Colombian state has certainly used unorthodox methods to fight you....” Those methods Restrepo was referring to are none other than parapolitics and paramilitarism: that was a project that was cold-bloodedly calculated for Colombia. It is an expression of fascism, through which mainly the financial monopolies, the industrial sector, and the landowners have benefited from all the economic restructuring resulting from globalization and privatizations in Colombia. The deals and profits these sectors have made are phenomenal. At the same time, what there is left to privatize in the country is at present minimal, which tells us that the most acute period of pushing forward the neoliberal project in Colombia is over to an extent, as there are no state companies of any size left to sell to the transnationals.

That is why the state is now trying to dismantle all the killing mechanisms they created as a military support for their fascist project to impose neoliberalism and, in this sense, we could draw a comparison with General Pinochet’s Chile. Remember that it was right when the military coup took place in Chile in 1973 that they started to implement neoliberal policies for the continent. The military coup practically wiped out the popular resistance, the working class, the middle classes of the population, the peasantry, and imposed the social discipline of the monopolies: fascism in the service of neoliberalism that used terror in our America as a basis for implementing its economic project and its ideological politics.

Now in Colombia the establishment has egg on its face: it is the institutions, along with the men that constitute them, that are implicated in the crisis they have led the nation into. Colombia is a country with one of the highest corruption rates in the world. It was said that Colombian institutions were created as a protection from all forms of corruption. That is why, in order to implement its neoliberal policies, the establishment threw overboard any sense of ethics in politics and now it is paying the price for its “unholy alliance” with narcoparamilitarism created with the intention of eliminating the revolutionary left whatever the cost. That model and that fascist project for Colombia have failed them. When the tidal wave of denouncements comes, the president tries, obviously, to avoid any kind of public debate, and creates smokescreens: the reelection, the referendum, the Soccer World Cup, etc., aiming to distract Colombian public opinion. The scandals and the corruption prevailing in Colombia are of such magnitude that none of these publicity “shows” can manage to distract attention away from one fundamental aspect: the corruption imposed by the “mafia,” paramilitarism, and narcotrafficking (which are the same thing) for a government that is a government of “mafiosi” exercising narcodemocracy.

JB: The ELN (National Liberation Army) recently decided to lay down its arms. To what extent does this weaken the armed struggle of the FARC–EP, given that from now on the Colombian state, the paramilitaries, and the United States will be able to concentrate all their efforts to fight it?

RG: The question of whether at present the whole counterinsurgent struggle orchestrated by the Colombian government and the United States can be focused against the FARC–EP is relative. Practically from the outset of Plan Colombia, the FARC–EP has withstood these operations [of the Colombian military and the United States] alone. There is no doubt that the Colombian state has never fought paramilitarism militarily. While military operations in areas where ELN comrades are active have been minimal, so, to some extent, the responsibility of combatting the bulk of operations by the Colombian army and the “gringos” have fallen on our armed organization. You must remember that at present Colombia is the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid, after Israel and Egypt. During the first stage of Plan Colombia, the United States provided $7.5 billion and the Colombian state imposed a war tax of 12 percent, which was increased this year by a further 8 percent. Even so, Plan Colombia and all subsequent operations have failed against the FARC–EP resistance and counteroffensive.

So it’s highly debatable whether the enemy can defeat us even if it trains its entire arsenal on us. Our history has shown this ever since our birth in Marquetalia (1964). Remember that sixteen thousand troops were moved into the region against the founding group of the FARC–EP made up of forty-eight peasants, two of them women. Besides, at that time, there was no other insurgent movement in the country either. The bulk of that offensive against the rural self-defense zones, known as “Operation LASO [Latin American Security Operation],” naturally hit the FARC–EP.

We believe, in this new period, that as far as military action by “gringo” troops, mercenaries, and the Colombian army are concerned, the limit has already been reached. What we’re talking about now is a decline. It must be said that in high circles of the Colombian government and the corridors of the Pentagon there is talk of the complete failure of “Plan Colombia,” “Plan Patriot,” “Plan Colombia Consolidation,” and “Plan Victory” (2002–07).

In other words, a military victory by the “gringos” and the Colombian state is impossible over an armed movement like ours that has been fighting for forty-three years and has extensive experience at the level of both its leadership and its combatants. It has to be said that this experience is almost unique in Latin America and the world. Just look at the fact that there’s currently no other great “plan” or “military operation” in the western hemisphere that has the scope and detail of the one being performed in central and southern Colombia, and throughout most of Colombia’s national territory.

We have truly had to fight a war alone. In the past there was the socialist camp, there was international solidarity, we had to “dance with the ugliest girl at the party,” as we say in Colombia. But we’ve shown we can confront and beat the enemy alone. For us, this is an obligation and it is our contribution of solidarity with the oppressed peoples of the world. The combination of all the forms of mass struggle is going to assure us victory in the near future.

The Colombian state has no alternative other than to accept that it has been incapable of defeating the insurgency and that its fascist project, which uses state terror and the chainsaw as an offensive weapon, has failed. The only thing left for this state to do is to seek a rapprochement with the insurgency so that we can sit down and talk to find a negotiated political solution to this long social and armed conflict affecting Colombia.

What you say about the ELN, well, that is the first I have heard about it....As far as I know the ELN has not laid down its arms. I cannot give an opinion on the ELN’s decisions. They are a sovereign organization, a guerrilla organization that has been fighting for years and, to my knowledge, have not so far handed over a single weapon.

JB: The FARC–EP was born from a peasant movement which continues to be its main social base. To what extent has the FARC–EP been able since then to implement a strategic reorientation in the light of extremely rapid urbanization in Colombia? In other words, how does the FARC–EP address the pauperized urban masses suffering constant attacks from the paramilitaries and the repression exercised by the Colombian state?

RG: I have been telling you that the FARC–EP is a politico-military organization, the struggle of the FARC–EP is not one of confrontation between apparatuses, i.e., between the military apparatus of the Colombian state and the FARC–EP’s military apparatus proper.

In general, if we analyze the behavior of bourgeois states over time, we observe that they have various ways of applying what they call “representative democracy” and that they combine practically all forms of struggle to exploit the people. The “gringos” call it the “carrot and stick approach,” which they practice in the following way: if they consider that the masses are meek, they can let them develop certain forms of restricted democracy for a time; if they consider that those masses are becoming radicalized, then they take troops into the streets and impose repression. But if they notice that those mass movements have already become radicalized, then they employ state terrorism, and wage genocide against their opponents and the extermination of the mass organizations. It is this terror at its most horrifying that was experienced by nearly all countries here in our America in the recent past and still persists in Colombia.

From this viewpoint, it is legitimate for the revolutionary movements of Colombia and the world to employ every form of mass struggle to achieve the revolutionary changes that society needs at a given moment in its development.

We have not declared armed struggle by decree, nor can it be declared by decree, or by the will of person or party X or Y. Armed struggle is born of the overriding need to defend class interests at a particular moment in time, when the bourgeoisie close every door of democracy and expression the masses may have.

Unfortunately, Colombia’s history has shown what I’ve just said to be true: seeking national reconciliation in 1982, the FARC–EP entered into dialogue with then-president Belisario Bétancourt and the Uribe Accords were signed. As a corollary of these accords the broad movement called the Patriotic Union (UP) was founded.

This movement erupted into national political life with enormous support among the inhabitants of town and country, the middle classes, students, etc. In other words, it was a movement that brought together very wide-ranging sectors. When the UP began to develop, the bourgeoisie panicked and commenced the planned systematic extermination—first of its leaders, then they massacred its members. This all ended in the most abhorrent political genocide ever seen in Latin America. The FARC–EP learned from this experiment, which was curtailed by state terrorism, and will not let history repeat itself.

We have been making an enormous effort with the creation and development of popular and political movements and organizations at the national level.

We are making an enormous effort with the formation of the Clandestine Colombian Communist Party, which has to be clandestine because we have already had over five thousand members of the UP killed.

We are also working on the formation of the Bolivarian Movement for the New Colombia, in which anyone can take part. This movement has no statutes, people can get together in small groups to avoid enemy strikes, nobody must allude to their political militancy, and its forms of expression are clandestine.

Through such forms of organization, we participate in the student movement, the workers’ movement, the peasant movement, the popular movement...but the FARC–EP is also setting up the Bolivarian Militias, which operate in the countryside, on the outskirts of big cities and within them.

The FARC–EP believe that the revolution in Colombia must, in part, lead to urban insurrectional expressions, perhaps very much like those that took place in Nicaragua at the time (let’s remind ourselves of the battles in Managua, Masaya, Estelí, and León, to name a few), which were guerrilla-type actions combined with popular insurrection, and which together brought down the Somoza dictatorship.

We are making a really big effort with regard to the union movement, the student movement, the urban middle classes, informal workers, the cooperative, and communal movement of family heads. In other words, we are trying to direct everything through simple forms of organization so as steadily to create from the inside-out a politico-practical consciousness of the need for change in Colombia, all the more so when the disastrous consequences of neoliberal policies not only radicalize the urban and rural masses but also, paradoxically, bring them together and ally them in their struggle.

In Colombia, the FARC–EP wishes to build a new government of national reconciliation and reconstruction, one that is broad and democratic, not exclusive in the slightest, in which all sectors of national political life can participate that are concerned about dragging Colombia out of the abyss it finds itself in and establishing it as a country that can face up to the challenges of the twenty-first century with a good deal of hope and optimism, putting us at the vanguard of the democratic and revolutionary nations of the world.

JB: Which social urban movements does the FARC–EP believe require strategic development in this process?

RG: In the cities we work fundamentally with the industrial workers sector. We are also active in the cooperative movement, with neighborhood communal action committees, with associations from the informal economy, which have grown in number in recent years due to neoliberal policies. In addition, we pay a lot of attention to the problems of women and young people in general. So we are represented in all those sectors. We are working conscientiously to give them an organizational character and steer them toward the political struggle.

At the same time, this political work, with the experiences it provides of ways of fighting repression, nourishes our own political action. Although the FARC–EP was born essentially as a peasant movement, and this base is maintained in its current make-up, it is also true that there are other sectors of Colombian society that are accompanying us in the struggle. There are middle classes and professional, technical, and upper-class sectors, as well as liberal professionals, clergy, and people from the world of popular culture and art in all its forms linked to the FARC–EP. This has been changing over recent years. We must emphasize the participation of women in our ranks, who now represent 43 percent of the guerrilla force.

JB: It is claimed that, in the regions under its control, the FARC–EP has not always shown itself to be capable of fully allowing the development of a civil society organized autonomously around the different interests it is made up of (cooperatives, unions, various associations, indigenous minorities, etc.). Doesn’t this situation reveal a rather authoritarian project for society based exclusively on the capabilities and competencies of a kind of party-state?

RG: [laughing] I don’t know where you’re going with that question or where we have had control over any part of the national territory. That has not happened yet. We are not waging a war of positions in Colombia. We are a nomadic guerrilla force. When we are in certain areas for a time, we develop direct democracy as it has never been seen in any other type of organization promoted by the state or the oligarchic parties.

As a matter of fact, I think that internally the FARC–EP is far more democratic than certain states and democracies; our maximum organ of leadership in the FARC–EP is the National Conference of Guerrilla Fighters, which meets every four years (or more, depending on the war situation). The leaders, without exception, are elected by the votes of all the guerrilla fighters. In other words, there are no appointments. It is by popular vote, by the votes of FARC–EP members, that democracy (and the question of hierarchies) is managed within the guerrilla movement.

In conjunction with the communities. The most significant case was that of San Vicente del Caguán, in south central Colombia during the period of clarity and dialogue from 1999 to 2002. We were there for three years and worked with the communities on civic-military activities. Between them, the civilian population and the “guerrillerada” built bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, local footpaths, and reclaimed certain rivers, creeks, and streams that were heavily polluted. In addition to this, the FARC–EP laid down regulations regarding ecology issues (hunting, fishing, tree felling, and forestry, and protection for native trees), all with the participation of the community.

For example, for the construction of a highway, 100 or 200 community action committees from the entire region were brought together and there, by popular vote, it was decided who was going to work, in what way, and how much they would contribute economically and logistically. Then the sums were done and these were handed over to the masses so they could work out for themselves how each of the contributions had been invested. This is open, participative democracy and true mass democracy such as Colombia has never seen before. That is our experience.

There is no place for authoritarianism in the principles of the FARC–EP. The thing is we defend principles. And when it comes to principles we are unwavering. We have our own vision of what democracy should be. Democracy should be open and as direct as possible. In other words, mass democracy as a way of defining and discussing major problems. It’s very simple, if there are a hundred people in a community, why should ten of them decide for everyone? For us those hundred people have the power to make decisions. In Colombia they talk to us about representative democracy because there are elections, but in reality these crooks, all these bums who go to the Senate or the Chamber of Representatives, are not real representatives of the communities.

They are mostly individuals who get there with the help of their wealth, through clientelism and by means of the threats they subject our people to. So, my dear journalist, it’s essential to be clear about what kind of democracy we’re talking about, what we the FARC–EP understand by democracy and what you in Europe understand by democracy. I consider the FARC–EP to be a democratic organization practicing democracy in the areas where it works.

Our option is a direct democracy that is as broad and participative as possible. Democracy exercised by and for majorities. Not paper democracy. Not democracy for a privileged few. We do not like that type of “democracy” and we are not going to practice it. I was saying that in the FARC–EP we like to organize the masses into all kinds of collectives so that they can defend their own interests. That is the secret of the FARC–EP’s existence in the midst of so complicated a conflict as Colombia’s.

JB: The FARC–EP is often criticized, even by leftist forces, for its internal use of “expedient” methods: as in the cases of deserters being executed, “demoralized” militants being sent on suicide missions, pregnant militants being forced to have abortions, and so on. There is no doubt that the FARC–EP is involved in an extremely tough armed struggle, but don’t such methods or practices strike at the individual rights of combatants or freedom of discussion at the heart of the guerrilla movement, thereby revealing an extremely vertical form of political organization in the purest Stalinist tradition?

RG: Your question shows how little is known about the FARC–EP and how, perhaps subconsciously, you are echoing all the enemy propaganda (the oligarchic Colombian regime and its ally the United States). It is the enemy who has claimed we are vertical, that we solve all problems in the expedient way you refer to in your question.

We use political methods to solve any type of problem within the FARC–EP. Initially new combatants attend a six-month training school where the materials studied are fundamentally the statutes, rules of command, and disciplinary regime. If applicants realize they cannot, for physical or moral reasons, obey those rules, they can return home no problem, because until that point they know nothing and nobody other than the people with whom, clandestinely, they have taken the initial training course. Once that level has been passed, the person makes a commitment and joins the FARC–EP for life, in other words, until the triumph of the revolution and in the subsequent construction of the new society.

We do not have obligatory military service or voluntary military service either. Admittance to the FARC–EP involves thorough development in political and military training, in terms of conscious training....Let’s not forget that anyone can use a weapon, but handling politics, the class struggle and social changes, in a society like ours, is much more complicated. This, which is what we are concerned with, calls for permanent long-term training.

It is not true then that we use firing squads or executions without trial, for instance. We have no need to because our statutes contain many ways of penalizing any violation of the organization’s discipline.

Execution by firing squad is only envisaged for traitors or infiltrators who are consciously working for the enemy. That is the most serious measure taken in the FARC–EP. Other than that, any situation can be dealt with using criticism and self-criticism based on Marxist-Leninist principles, which are an integral part of our revolutionary concept.

The other issue, reflected in your question’s content, is a defamatory campaign seeking to reduce the FARC–EP to an undisciplined movement, without a hierarchy and without recognized leaders. A military organization simply cannot survive in those conditions. There is a saying that goes “the discipline is complied with or the militia is washed up.”

It would be absurd to think we could send people on missions who are demoralized, have psychological problems, or lack the sufficient politico-military qualifications. (In a war situation, who could possibly make such a miscalculation?) Quite the contrary, within the FARC–EP participation in missions constitutes a recognition of good work, and is an incentive and an honor for combatants. The FARC–EP employs conscious participation, which is why, prior to action, the leaders make a detailed study of the qualities of the combatants who are to participate in each of the war activities or on special missions determined by the FARC–EP.

As for the conditions of women in the guerrilla force, they are free. In other words, for the first time a left-wing organization and revolutionary movement has defined women as people who are absolutely free and enjoy full equality with men, taking on the same responsibilities and the same jobs, and having the same rights. Ever since the matriarchal era, it’s perhaps only now, in the guerrilla struggle, that women are beginning to play the part they lost in the past, which was the greatest defeat the female gender has suffered in the history of humanity.

As for the issue of pregnancy in the FARC–EP, the female fighters know from the outset that in the war situation they have to go through they cannot get pregnant. Within our organization, we do a lot of educational work on diffusion of information and prevention so that women are well informed about this matter and about how to avoid pregnancy and/or sexually transmitted diseases.

Sometimes, by mistake or by accident, there are cases of involuntary pregnancy. Taking into consideration the objective rules and living conditions in the midst of combat, they are generally interrupted at the request of the combatants themselves. In these cases the interruption is carried out in hygienic, sterile conditions, by qualified doctors with all the necessary measures taken to prevent any risk to their lives.

The interruption of pregnancy has been legalized in many countries and is part of certain constitutions around the world, but we have always been accused of arbitrariness on this matter and we have been demonized. What is going on here? Double standards, that’s what.

We want you to know that, for the FARC–EP, family values and the family unit are the basis for the conception of the new society we want to build. But we’re at a stage that doesn’t facilitate the development of this important aspect of life in any way.

It is telling that, in spite of all the propaganda waged against our organization, the female presence in the ranks of the FARC–EP accounts for 40 percent of combatants at present. The FARC–EP’s women fighters are real Amazons on the battlefield, or as Simon Bolivar said, in reference to those brave Roman women warriors, they are real “Bellonas.” When they are away from the war situation, the behavior of our female comrades is very feminine. In combat, they are every bit as tough as the men. They teach us about honesty, dedication, sacrifice, fraternity, and heroism...we could hardly mistreat our female comrades, they are a fundamental part of the struggle for the triumph of our revolution.

JB: Señor Granda, who was responsible for the deaths of the eleven congressional representatives detained by the FARC–EP? How is it possible that those eleven hostages were all together in the same place? Do you think it was a deliberate operation by the Colombian state to launch a vast political campaign against the FARC–EP guerrilla movement?

RG: The FARC–EP had been warning public opinion at home and abroad that operations to rescue prisoners by force posed an exaggerated threat to the lives of the hostages it was holding.

This is why the FARC–EP has pointed out that responsibility for the deaths of the eleven representatives from the Valle del Cauca on June 18, 2007, lies mainly with those who gave the order and aided the rescue attempt by force—Uribe, first and foremost.

To explain why they were together would be to indulge in speculation because on that date you remember I had just left prison in La Dorada.

What has to be said about the deaths of the eleven congressmen is that it was undoubtedly a meticulously prepared plan, both politically and militarily, and also in terms of propaganda.

Uribe’s government began its plan by talking about the possibility of releasing a number of FARC–EP prisoners for whom no one had made any request, because we had sought a bilateral humanitarian exchange of prisoners between the FARC–EP and the government. But then, Uribe took the completely unilateral decision to free some of the FARC–EP combatants. This, in my view, had to do with the preparations for action on a larger scale in the Colombian mountains.

That covertly planned action was none other than the rescue of the twelve congressional representatives by a special force of CIA agents, British and Israeli mercenaries, and Colombian army commandos.

The intended blow was that, if this special force appeared to have successfully freed the twelve congressional representatives, Uribe would have kept in prison those he was supposedly attempting to free and embarked on a political campaign at home and abroad claiming that ransoms would henceforth be the most appropriate way to secure the release of those being held by the FARC–EP, thereby ruling out the feasibility of humanitarian exchange or any possibility of dialogue.

The result of this and other similar events have led us to believe that Lima- or Entebbe-style rescue operations cannot be repeated in the Colombian rainforests. What is unequivocally required in Colombia is a humanitarian exchange between the government and the FARC–EP as a preamble to dialogue that might open the way to peace with social justice. Let us hope that many of your readers, the international community, and social, religious, humanist, and left-wing states, governments, peoples, parties, and organizations can contribute toward this search for a solution to the social and armed conflict taking place in Colombia

INTERVIEW WITH COMRADE SONU

From an undisclosed location in Chhattisgarh: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) and its People's Liberation Guerilla Army are gearing up to meet the strongest possible offensive from the Indian state in Chhattisgarh.

In an exclusive interview to CNN-IBN, a key member of the Maoist organisation has accepted that the Maoists are being cornered and survival is now an issue as security forces are mounting a strong pressure on them.

The Maoists, however, claim they are preparing for a long-drawn battle against the security forces. They call it teer khale jung

It was an interview organized by the Maoists to send out a message to the Prime Minister and the state. And it took a 10-day trek to reach the Maoist heartland.

Walking with an armed escort, this correspondent managed to meet Comrade Sonu, the Number Two in the politburo of Communist Party of India (Maoist) after Ganpathi.

First, Comrade Sonu admitted to the presence of Naxals in Nandigram.

"Yes, we are in Nandigram, we have worked there. But the people themselves are fighting there. We have just joined them to fight the CPI-M goons," Comrade Sonu reveals.

Explaining his party's opposition to SEZs, Comrade Sonu says: "There are 432 SEZs all over India. The Central and State governments are giving our land to multinationals. Many laws are being changed. So the people are opposing it. We are also opposing it."

Asked about the wrong tactics adopted by his party in Andhra Pradesh, he says: "Actually we have had setbacks in Andhra Pradesh. We adopted some wrong tactics in the state, so we are very weak over there right now."

The CPI (Maoist) politburo member admitted some of his key comrades are now behind bars. "Many of our comrades are in jail. On December 17, Kerela Central Committee member Comrade Satena was arrested. Central Committee member Comrade Vijay has been arrested. Comrade Sanyal is also in jail. This is normal in any revolution. But certain arrests have happened because of our weaknesses," he says.

Asked to comment on the Salwa Judum movement, Comrade Sonu said his party will defeat the Salwa Judum. "Because it is a threat to the tribals. It is the duty of the people to defeat it. It is a fascist organisation. It must be defeated."

Narrating his party's war tactics against the Indian state, the CPI (Maoist) leader said his men have adopted guerrilla tactics to fight the Indian state. "The Indian Prime Minister says Naxalites are the main threat to internal security. We know the state is at us. So we have adopted guerrilla tactics. With the common man, we will defeat the state. We will die for the people, we will work for the people, we are the servants of the people."

INTERVIEW WITH PRACHANDA

CPNM VEIWS.....

Excerpts of a recent interview with Maoist Chairman Prachanda:

Q. You have begun election activities earlier than other parties. Have you really launched the election campaign?

Prachanda: Definitely, we have started our election campaign. There is no reason to doubt this. We are fully convinced that the Constituent Assembly elections provide the most democratic way to resolve the country’s problems, and that they should be held on time.

Q. What is the basis to say that the Constituent Assembly (CA) polls which weren’t possible in November last year would be held in April this year?

Prachanda: We see two key differences in the two (November and April) situations. One difference is political: For the first time, there is a clear mention of republic in Nepal’s Constitution. This has provided us a good environment to go for the polls. The second (difference) is related to the peace process that includes relief to the martyrs’ families, treatment to the injured, the issue of searching the disappeared persons and cantonment management, among others. The 23-point agreement has addressed these issues.

Q. Earlier, you used to claim that the CA polls wouldn’t be possible as long as the monarchy existed. Now, a republic has been proclaimed only partially. How can you be sure that the elections will be held?

Prachanda: As mentioned in the interim constituent, the country can be declared a republic before the elections if there’s any serious hurdle to the polls (by the king). This has substantially diminished the morale of feudal elements, and their resistance capacity. However, one cannot be fully assured.

Q. It has been declared that you will be contesting the polls from two constituencies— Kathmandu and Rolpa districts. Is it so because you doubt your victory in Kathmandu?

Prachanda: Absolutely not. Here, my ideological, political and a little bit of emotional relations have come into play. Because, Rolpa is the epicenter of the people’s war from where we started the revolt. On the other hand, Kathmandu has been the centre of all people’s movements through out Nepal’s history. The 19-day revolt was a fusion of the people’s movement and the people’s war that started the process of institutionalizing the (political) change. So, these two constituencies have been chosen for my candidacy so as to reflect the fusion of the people’s war and the people’s movement. It has nothing to do with winning or loosing in either of the places.

Q. Many have predicted that your party will lose the upcoming elections in an unprecedented manner. What do you say?

Prachanda: Whoever has thought that way, they have thought wrongly. The results will be just the opposite. Our party is going to emerge as the number one party. Our party’s recent central meeting was focused on an objective assessment of the polls. Assessing the reports from various parts of the country we clearly found that we are going to be the number one party and we will receive the highest percentage of votes even without forging alliance with any other party.

Q. How many seats do you think your party will win?
Prachanda: We expect to win 100 to 120 seats.

Q. If your party is that capable then why do you talk about electoral alliances with other parties?

Prachanda: We said that considering the historical demands. Winning 120 seats would also not provide a majority. This is an election to a constituent assembly and not a parliamentary one. It’s also not about ruling the entire state after securing a thin majority. It requires national consensus to formulate a constitution. We have been proposing to work together with the Nepali Congress and UML so as to facilitate the formulation of the constitution in the future.

Q. Is it true that the CPN-Maoist is uniting with the CPN-Unity Center for the elections?

Prachanda: Ever since we joined the peace process, we have been talking about unification with them. And the necessity and possibility of unification has heightened as we have decided to go for the elections. At this juncture, we have tentatively agreed to jump-start the unification process.

Q. You have geared up for the elections but how confident are you about the polls actually taking place?

Prachanda: We are preparing for the election as we are confident about it. Reason: the Nepali people do not see any alternative to the elections. That’s why the CA election will take place. And, if it does not, it will be unfortunate for Nepal.

Q. In what way would it be unfortunate?

Prachanda: If the polls are disrupted or if any attempt is made to disrupt them, two possible scenarios are likely to emerge in Nepal. First, an attempt to disrupt the elections could be made by assassinating the top leaders and making the environment volatile just like in Pakistan. However, looking at the Nepali people’s consciousness and the preparations of the political parties and the Maoists for the elections, I don’t think that the polls could be disrupted even if some leaders are assassinated.

The second possibility is recurrence of what transpired in Bangladesh. There is army coup in Bangladesh with a civil face. A strong backing from the western powers behind it is apparent. And, here in our country also some new faces have been inducted in the cabinet in an abnormal manner. That gives rise to the suspicion that Nepal could be moving towards an incident similar to Bangladesh.

Q. You talked about an assassination plot, is that aimed at you?

Prachanda: It could be targeted not only against us, but could be aimed at the rank and file of any political party.

Q. Who is posing such a threat?

Prachanda: One of them could be the royalists and feudalists as the country would be declared a republic soon after the CA polls. Second, some international power centers do not want to see a communist dominance here. Western agencies like the CIA are notorious when it comes to carrying out such assassinations. So the possibility that they could make similar attempts here cannot be ruled out. For, a communist dominance in this country through elections would not only influence Nepal but the whole of South Asia and the world.

Q. You only accused the royal palace and America. You don’t see any threat from India?

Prachanda: International power centers mean not only the US but also India.

Q. If such conspiracies are really being hatched, how insecure do you personally feel?

Prachanda: Though there is a possibility (of being a target), I personally do not feel insecure so far as I am inside the security ring of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Recently, the state has also deployed police force (for my security).

Q. A few months ago you had claimed that a conspiracy to murder American diplomats was being hatched. But, you failed to respond with evidence when the then US ambassador (James F.) Moriarty sought bases (to substantiate the claim). Isn’t your latest claim similar to the previous one?

Prachanda: Before he returned to America, Moriarty had realised that whatever I had said at that time was true. And, the current American establishment also clearly knows that what I had said was true. I had passed on this information to them in direct/indirect manner through an inner-level.

Q. It seems that you have some internal ties with the US even though you criticise it outwardly?

Prachanda: I am not talking about any such internal-outer thing. Our friends have gone to the US to participate in a United Nations programme. In some function of the intellectuals they had met with the US ambassador. But, we don’t have formal relations. Unless the US removes the terrorist tag imposed on us we cannot talk about cordial relations. However, it is moving towards a progressive direction.

Q. Yet, you perceive threats from the CIA?
Prachanda: (Nodding) Yes, the threat still persists.

Q. Earlier, you pointed out at the possibility of a “democratic coup” like the one staged in Bangladesh. What does that mean?

Prachanda: It means a few people with a democratic face run the government but with the backing from the army. Unlike what Parvez Musharraff did by bringing the army directly to the forefront, stage a coup by showing a civil face.

Q. Is that possible in Nepal?

Prachanda: I don’t see that possibility. However, a small section supporting the status quo and the hard-liners in the Nepal Army may dream that sometimes. There are also some persons who think likewise in the major parties.

Q. Is that why you expressed anger over Chief of Army Staff General Rukmangad Katuwal during the joint assembly at the Open Air Theatre?

Prachanda: The important point is whether it was correct or not, rather than the anger. First of all the Army Chief seemed to be trying to encourage enmity by making remarks on a one-month old issue after returning from Delhi. Secondly, he tried to do politics while speaking against politics before leaving for China. It can be thus understood that he was trying to play politics since it was unnecessary to speak on the army integration issue. Even the parties have no problem with this issue (Nepal Army-PLA integration).

Q. Since the Army Chief under your government had spoken blatantly, departmental action could have been taken against him rather than making a speech against him at the Open Air Theatre, right?

Prachanda: As the Army Chief had made disillusioning remarks publicly, he needed to be responded publicly. Hence, we adopted the same measure. Discussions on taking action against him will surely be carried out among the seven parties since it is a technical matter.

Q. You have been stating that you met with two Generals of Nepal Army in the hotels of Kathmandu. The army, however, denied your statement. What is the truth?

Prachanda: The meeting was not carried out secretly. The first meeting took place after consulting with Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala. Besides, his security advisor was also present during the meeting with the three Generals of Nepal Army at Hotel Ambassador in Lazimpat. Our party’s team comprising of 3-4 leaders was also present there. The meeting dwelt on the ways of resolving the army integration procedure. After that, our second meeting with three Nepal Army Generals took place in a hotel during the visit of a security specialist from South Africa. That discussion was also carried out openly; there was no restriction on such a meeting taking place. I was surprised when the Nepal Army refuted the meetings.

Q. You have said that the process of integrating the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into the Nepal Army has to be started before the CA polls. Is that possible?

Prachanda: The interim constitution itself mentions that discussions on army integration must be forwarded by forming a special committee. However, the integration cannot and should not take place before the CA at any cost. Nonetheless, its discussions must be started now.

Q. But the Nepal Army has been saying “No” to the integration idea?

Prachanda: The army is not supposed to make statements on the integration issue. The 12-point agreement was reached on a political level, which is mentioned in the interim constitution. The Nepal Army cannot issue remarks in this regard since the issue has been included in the peace agreement.

Q. How do you think the integration could take place?

Prachanda: We do not believe that the entire Nepal Army and PLA should be mixed in the national army to be formed. The exact number (of PLA fighters to be integrated in the national army) has not been mentioned anywhere so far. The agreement reached till date accepts the identity and fostering of both the armies and according to the principle both has to be mixed and integrated. The conclusion is that the qualified PLAs must be there in the new national army and in case of Nepal Army only “fit” and “qualified” can be integrated in the new army.

Q. Will the democratization of the Nepal Army be judged qualitatively that way?

Prachanda: The Nepal Army still has one “culture” since yesteryears; their notion of “owing to the King” has to be changed. The way the officers treat the juniors has to be stopped. On the other hand, the PLAs who do not meet the minimum “criteria” internationally required to make an army professional cannot join the national army. They may join the police or industrial security force. What I am trying to say is- those possessing feudal attitude have to be terminated and also those unfit professionally.

Q. Some people have also accused you of planning a “grand design” of capturing the central power by integrating PLA in the Nepal Army?

Prachanda: Plainly speaking, that is nonsense. Some Generals of the Nepal Army are loyal to a handful of elites and feudalists; they have always disliked change and democracy. That’s why they want to disrupt the peace process by making false allegations on Maoists. But now, institutionally the Nepal Army does not seem to be a hurdle in the peace process. What we’ve understood in one and a half years is that 95 percent of the army officers say we have to harmonize with the Maoists, and not fight. They say the monarchy has ended and want to maintain peace by establishing a republic. Hence, we believe the Nepal Army will not be an obstacle to creating new Nepal. I don’t have any personal grudge against the (Army) Chief. The way he comments contradictorily in the middle of something shows that he himself is vacillating.

Q. Is there any chance of you heading for agitation or revolt if the CA polls are not held on the stipulated date?

Prachanda: We will not return to guerrilla warfare if that kind of situation emerges, whether the setback is in the name of Madhes or the royal palace. It means we will rather bring about the change through a peaceful struggle assembling millions of people on the streets. We will work towards returning the leadership to the hands of the people and creating election atmosphere.

Q. Let’s change the topic; PM Koirala is not in a very good health, will the country take pace in this situation?

Prachanda: I do not want to comment about Girijababu (PM Koirala) now. Currently, the country faces a great challenge. The Prime Minister’s illness, age has become a subject of great concern for all of us. I don’t see any alternative (to PM Koirala) before the elections at the moment. In the current context, rather than giving personal comments, I wish nothing happens to Girijababu until the election.

Q. Earlier you used to talk about making Girjababu the founder president, but lately there are talks about you yourself becoming the president. What is the truth?

Prachanda: We are not talking about becoming the president before the constituent assembly. It is still true that Girijababu will be the president if the country is declared a republic before the CA polls. We don’t have any problem with that. As far as the decisions of our central committee and the recently concluded national assembly, Republic Nepal’s first president should be our party chairman.

Q. Does that mean you will be President by 2008?

Prachanda: Our party will definitely win a majority in the elections. Even after that the situation will be in favour of our party, thus the announcement was made confidently.

Q. So, you will be the first president…

Prachanda: Our party chairman will be, not me.

Q. Lately you have been stating Nepal needs a new Jung Bahadur and Buddha. What does that mean?

Prachanda: I said so metaphorically. The Nepali people want peace, which means they want a new Buddha. And they also want a new form of Jung Bahadur to end the prevailing anarchy. If we look up in history, there was excessive anarchy and confusion in the country after the signing of the Sugauli Treaty until the rise of Jung Bahadur. I don’t have sympathy for Jung Bahadur, nonetheless if a character like his had not appeared, the situation would have gotten worse.

Q. You mean a kind of dictator is needed even now to establish peace?

Prachanda: To establish peace somebody with a “broad” mind like that of Gautam Buddha is needed. But, the authority has to exercise tyranny as well to end anarchy. Authority means tyranny. There won’t be authority if it can’t practice tyranny. Therefore, I mentioned Jung Bahadur and Buddha metaphorically for dictatorship and peace. However, now a people’s democratic tyranny is needed and not the kind of tyranny Jung Bahadur practised.

Q. Is your party trying to play the role of a new form of Jung Bahadur and Buddha?

Prachanda: The point is peace has to be maintained and anarchy ended as well. Only the CPN-Maoist can and must play that role. The whole implication is that we who are in leadership must prepare ourselves for this.

Q. Another topic again; how will the King be sidelined whilst implementing a republic? Earlier there were talks about making him the founder president, but now that you yourself are a candidate?

Prachanda: First of all, the King had a chance to become the founder president before February 1, 2005. But now the people won’t consider that. Secondly, the Nepali people have a big heart and will spare (the King) if he says he wants to live a normal life peacefully. And, our party will also work towards creating environment for him to live like a normal citizen and do his business since our party feels the transformation of republic must not be necessarily done violently. However, I think the Nepali people also know how to punish those who maintain their old notorious character.

Q. Despite playing a significant role in moving the country towards a republic, you yourself have been socialising with pro-monarchists. Isn’t this contradictory?

Prachanda: Our stance in terms of ending the status quoist monarchy and establishing a democratic republic has never changed. But, those persons, who can also be called nationalists, thought the King could protect the country in the yester years; and all of them must not be eliminated. Instead, we believe that the country can be protected and a new Nepal can be constructed only if we include and jointly work with them.

Q. How do you see that the country is at stake?

Prachanda: Any nation becomes weak during transitional phase. The power-centres worldwide are playing their own ways to take advantage of Nepal’s current situation. Hence, we are saying our nationality is at risk. The extremist section of the Indian establishment, too, wants the instability in Nepal to continue. Even a superpower like America wants to influence India and China taking advantage of Nepal’s geo-political situation. Communal slogans like Terai-Hilly, Eastern-Western are being chanted openly. While this has put our nationality at risk, our land at several bordering areas including Susta and Kalapani is being encroached upon. Therefore, it seems that all Nepalis must unite to secure territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Q. You said our nationality faces threats from India, but you meet with the chief of Indian secret service agency, RAW, and run to the Indian embassy to talk with the ambassador. What does this mean?

Prachanda: India is a big country; there’s another India in the same India. There’s a good India and a bad India too. The Indian establishment comprises of both extremists and liberals. We definitely have good relations with those in favour of a positive change and peace in Nepal. Naturally we have relation at diplomatic levels. So, meeting the ambassador or some Indian agency falls under diplomatic ties.

Q. Can the meeting with a secret service agency chief be dubbed as a diplomatic contact?

Prachanda: The matter of meeting with officials of a secret agency is false. Many people, representatives of Indian political parties come through the embassy to meet us. They (Indian Embassy officials) must have sent some people stating they were intellectuals or experts while hiding that they were actually from a secret service agency.

Q. Final question, when do you think will Nepal enter the phase of peace and stability?

Prachanda: Nepal will enter the phase of peace, stability and development after the CA polls. The Nepali people will have reached a decision by the end of Nepali year 2065 BS even if the elections do not take place by then

INTERVIEW-Philippine army struggles to improve credibility

MANILA, Jan 28 (Reuters) - The Philippine army will struggle to defeat communist rebels and Islamic militants unless it curbs corruption and ensures that troops do not violate human rights, an administration lawmaker said on Monday.

Security forces have set themselves a mid-2010 deadline to wipe out the Maoist-led New People's Army (NPA) guerrillas and the Abu Sayyaf, a small Islamic military group with ties to al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah.

"Our military suffers a very serious credibility problem," Ruffy Biazon, vice-chairman of the House of Representatives panel on national defence, told Reuters in an interview.

"It has been distracting soldiers from carrying out their missions. The issues of corruption and rights abuses are too heavy a burden on their shoulders."

Since the late 1960s, the Philippines has been fighting two internal battles -- against communist rebels seeking to topple the central government in Manila and Muslim separatists aspiring to set up an independent Islamic state in the south.

The two conflicts have killed more than 160,000 people and stunted economic growth in one of the most resource-rich states in Southeast Asia, driving potential investors and tourists to its much more stable neighbours, such as Singapore and Malaysia.

"BODY COUNT"

As part of the security drive, military chief General Hermogenes Esperon has said he wants to dismantle 15 NPA rebel bases within the next three months, the amount of time his tenure in office has been extended by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

But Biazon said such a campaign "will not a result in a victory for us, it will only increase body count".

Local rights groups have accused soldiers of waging a "dirty war" against activists, holding them responsible for about 1,000 extrajudicial killings and disappearances since 2001.

The army denies the executions were official policy and has blamed rogue soldiers and internal purges within the NPA rebels.

Biazon also criticised the military for its failure to end graft after tenders for six attack helicopters were stopped last week over allegations of irregularities in the bidding procedures.

"Corruption remains in the senior ranks," he said, adding it was an issue that provoked younger army officers to plot against the government.

Biazon said he favoured allocating more funds to the military to modernise its equipment, such as aircraft, warships and trucks. Much of the equipment is obsolete and was left by the United States after the Vietnam War in the 1960s-70s.

"Our military needed more funds not just to allow them to fight our internal security threats, but guard our vast borders against illegal fishing, poaching and smuggling activities," he said.

On Monday, a bicameral panel of the Senate and the House of Representatives was due to approve the government's 1.2 trillion pesos budget for 2008.

"But, the bigger battles would be within its ranks -- reducing graft and putting forward a more friendly face to the people," Biazon said. (Reporting by Manny Mogato, editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan and Katie Nguyen)

Interview with Manuel Marulanda Velez commander in chief of the FARC-EP

Dear Comrades a Interview with Triofijo Manuel Marulanda (2002)from FARC Press.

ANEEB


1. What kind of government they want the FARC?

The FARC want a pluralistic government (which represent all political parties and social sectors), democratic and patriotic.

2. What is the position with regard to the FARC Peace?

The position in relation to our Peace is in the Platform of 10 points, which at the same time constitute a platform of government is not finished, it must be enriched further, by the people themselves.

3. Which view of the proposal by incoming Prime Minister, to make a policy of the State Peace?

We think it is a good proposal if it is motivated by electoral purposes and demagogic.

Making Peace a State policy means:

A. That policy Peace will not be subject to the whims of the rulers of the day, but will have continuity.
B. The Peace, as a State policy, it should be aimed at eradicating all objective factors that made a considerable number of compatriots, rose up in arms against the Establishment.
These objective factors, among others, are:
Absence of a genuine agrarian reform, which will give the land to those who work, poor health, housing, education, work, etc.. All because of the unequal distribution of wealth. This is compounded by the institutionalized violence of the state, exercised through its repressive bodies, in order to maintain social order without alteration well established for the benefit of the ruling class.

4. You Paramilitaries a dialogue with the state?

We do not dialogaremos with the Paramilitaries, who were legitimate children of the State. It was the same State who created, organized and directed, with the direct participation and advice of some General of the Republic, as Harold Bedoya, immediate superior of Fidel and Carlos Castaño.
As was the State who created them, should be the same State who dissolves, condemning prior to the authors and instigators of many massacres that have afflicted the country. In addition, talk mean ridding the State of the responsibility which assists in the organization of these groups.
This explains why, they have never been registered Official clashes between the army and these groupings. By contrast, patrol and live together on military bases. This is quite evident in Urabá.

Which is what makes these groups?

These groups do the dirty work that the Army, for image problem, it can not be done, as is the massacre of defenseless people, for the sole crime of thinking in different areas of politics, the Oligarquía Liberal-conservadora.

5. Which view of the "Cooperative Living"?

These are the institutionalization of Paramilitary groups by the State.

6. What is the Movimiento Bolivariano?

There is a broad popular movement, which includes people of different political and religious overtones, which are identified in two respects:

A. Disowning towards the ruling class and its corrupt and exclusionary to govern.
B. Sympathy toward the FARC.

The Bolivarian Movement is a movement similar to the Patriotic Union, with the difference that this is illegal, not to murder him as the UP
The Movement will be conducted directly by the FARC.

7. Relations with the Party law.

Our relations with the Party will be respectful and have legal basis:
A. The recognition of the existence of two directorates: the Legal and ours.
B. It appears that neither of these two addresses may give orders to the other.
C. The work is our immediate militants attract more consequential legal party and explain how wrong, the political line followed by them. It should be esclarecerles the problem, those who are still confused, with the objective of gaining them and make them act in accordance with our strategic plan. This should be a permanent job, wise and intelligent, avoiding the anti-partido; that we are first and foremost Communists.

8. Elections.

We are going to prevent politicians from entering the traditional areas of guerrilla influence, to make political campaign. We can not continue to allow:
A. Let them come to our area to deceive the people and get votes and then adopt in Congress, legislation against the interests of the people that elected. If circumstances permit, from hiding, we will launch our own candidates, to channel our supporters.
B. In this country, long ago ceased to exist due to political opponents to the regime, and so it is impossible to use the forums so bourgeois revolutionary, as directed Lenin, because here in Colombia, who represents the real opposition and to be elected public corporations, is killed without any consideration.

9. Dialogues in the midst of war. What say?

We agree with dialogues in the midst of war, but we feel that to talk must have an area cleared and free from military confrontations. That is why we are raising the clearance of the four municipalities: The Uribe, Mesetas, Vista Hermosa and Macarena.

10. Why before, to be able to converse only asking clearing La Uribe, and three municipalities now require more?

Because now we are a little bigger, that when asked La Uribe.

11. Which view of the regional dialogues?

The regional dialogues will be welcome, provided they are the direct result of political negotiations between the national secretariat of the FARC and the Central government.

12. Militias. There are many kinds of militias?

There are two classes: the Popular and Bolivarianas.

13. Which Popular?

They are those composed of individuals whose age or physical condition prevents them from direct involvement in the military with the enemy. By ahem: The elderly, children and so on.
The Bolivarian Militias on the other hand, have a military structure and are composed of physically suitable for direct military confrontation with the enemy.
The union Solidarity Party are Clandestine and are shaped by the Nuclei Solidarity Base or Cells Clandestinas. To find out their operation is necessary to know the functioning of the cells match, with the difference being illegal, there is a strict compartmentalization among its members, where each member of the Core Solidarity is known by two companions.

14. Neutrality active. What think of this?

It is a political concept rigged, which seeks to locate outside of class struggle in a society divided into classes.

Interview with Farc Commander Ivan Marquez on Colombia Hostage Crisis

The Bolivarian Press Agency, ABP, at the news from Bogota on the interception and seizure of evidence for survival of POWs who were destined to President Hugo Chavez interview on the matter to Ivan Marquez (IM); member of the Secretariat of the FARC.

ABP .- Ivan, What are the immediate consequences of the intercept tests of survival and the capture of the emissaries that the carrying humanitarian by the Colombian authorities in Bogota yesterday?

IM: This is another stab trapera Uribe to the hope that we had all encryption in managing humanitarian exchange. The tests were destined to President Chavez and the Colombian government knew. That was one of the commitments arising in Miraflores as a prelude to the necessary interview Chávez-Marulanda in Yarí, which surely would find formulas definitive solution to the humanitarian tragedy of prisoners held by the warring parties. Uribe is a saboteur desalmado capable of the worst evils, and probably calculated that this action reversaba zero efforts of President Chavez and Sen. Cordoba. It Ladino and cruel as his mentor Santander, why has no compunction in arresting and legally prosecute those who were performing as important as invaluable humanitarian mission.

ABP .- How does this action of President Uribe's contribution evidence survival of the remaining prisoners?

IM .- The folly of Bogota compelled to take drastic measures because the FARC could not run freely and assume the risk that he may be detained other emissaries. We deeply regret that the whole family can not receive, as was our desire tests lives of their loved ones in this Christmas. This reaffirms our certainty that Uribe is a saboteur. With Uribe acting in this way there will never be redemption. This requires a new government that takes fiber of humanity to realize the desired exchange, and not only, but allows direct the country towards peace with social justice. Here Uribe is repeating what it did with Simon Trinidad.

ABP .- President Uribe has set as a condition to talk about humanitarian exchange for the FARC not to play any political role in it. What do you think about this strange determination?

IM .- How not going to be protagonists of the first order if the FARC are one of the warring parties. We will not be silent partners with anyone, nor convidados stone in a case that is solved is with us. The FARC therefore never appear in the process of humanitarian exchange with a gag intended as President Uribe. That means the whole world. What is happening is that Uribe never ceases to obstruct any efforts in that direction to use sticks to the wheel of this process. It had done its descabellados irremovable, such as delusional to pretend that one party delivers the prisoners in their possession while the other does not get to yours. That is not an exchange anywhere.

ABP Bogota .- The government has suggested the possibility of replacing the mediation of President Chavez on the other taken by President Sarkozy of France, What do you think about that?

IM .- If Chavez is not, then who? What Uribe has done is irreparable harm. President Chavez was consulting all the steps with the government of Colombia and timely reporting to the President Sarkozy, who, according transpired, he was prepared to accompany Chavez in his interview with the commander Marulanda in Yarí. That was the formula for hope. Chavez was in perfect tune with the two sides, but the Palacio de Nariño paid him with a kick when he was about to accomplish in a few days what Uribe failed in more than 5 years with his outbursts guerreristas. The President Sarkozy can play an important role so that the process of return swap with the initial course that Chavez was yielding the best results. Who knows if you can do it

An Interview with Alvaro Garcia, Vice President of Bolivia

Coming to Terms with Diversity in Bolivia


As head of Congress and the major political operator for President Evo Morales, Bolivia's Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera stands in the eye of a political hurricane. The changes proposed by the Movement toward Socialism (MAS) government have unleashed protest from conservative sectors of society, leading to suspension of the Constituent Assembly called to revamp the nation's political institutions.

Garcia Linera says the conflicts are to be expected, as Bolivian society takes on "the two conquests of equality"-political rights for indigenous peoples and economic equality through a redistribution of national wealth. He calls the Morales administration a "government of social movements" and describes the goals to build "institutions that allow us to recognize our pluralism" and "generate minimal levels of access to opportunities and resources."

LC: The government of Evo Morales came to power with the symbolic force of being the first indigenous president in the country, and has promised to address an historic backlog of demands for indigenous rights. But the government also faces the challenge of achieving some degree of unity to carry out deep transformations in society. In practice, how do you reconcile these two responsibilities?

AGL: The presence of the first indigenous president is without a doubt the most important symbolic break in the last centuries in Bolivia because it re-establishes a principle of equality that had been denied by colonial and neo-colonial practices and certain customs and mentalities in society.

But soon we saw that while political equality was advancing, the challenge remained to expand advances in political equality into other realms, in this case, the economic realm in the form of a new redistribution of wealth. The society required that both these tasks be taken on together-political equality and the recognition of the equality of indigenous peoples, their culture, and their language; but also a redistribution of wealth to improve peoples' access to resources.

And that's where the job of President Morales' government has gotten complicated.

LC: Why is that?

AGL: In other societies, political equality is not necessarily accompanied by an immediate effort to redistribute wealth. South Africa is a case in point: there was a huge battle for political equality and a slower process of redistribution or economic equality. In the case of Bolivia, the two tasks had to be taken on simultaneously.

The more privileged sectors felt obliged by modernity and general advances to accept political equality, but to accept redistribution of wealth is another matter. It generates more resistance from groups that are accustomed not only to holding positions of power but also to a form of allotment that traditionally set aside public resources with their families' names on them.

This is the most difficult part of what we've taken on-the two conquests of equality. But the fact that there was already a democratic and redistributive agenda proposed by society since the year 2000 meant we had to assume both tasks simultaneously, with the all the difficulties that you're seeing in these days and weeks-all predictable, of course.

LC: How do you convince or obligate sectors with historic privileges to cede privileges in order to establish this new state and society?

AGL: It requires on the part of the most privileged sectors-not "generosity"-because in politics and economics that term doesn't exist-but a strategic viewpoint. This isn't a movement that at any time seeks to annul privileges. This is a movement that seeks to generate minimal levels of access to opportunities and resources.

From a strategic point of view, the most privileged sectors would understand that the best way to preserve part of their privileges is to cede part of their privileges. But when they are not willing to cede a part of these privileges, what that does is generate pressure that's more and more adverse to them, with the risk that all their privileges could be affected.

The program of the underclasses of Bolivia doesn't propose the socialization of all wealth or property. This type of proposals still hasn't emerged in Bolivia. What you see is the demand for opportunities, a demand to take part in the distribution of resources. I haven't seen anyone who's saying "we have to take all the land away from the hacendados (large landowners)." They say, "We also have a right to have land." Same with natural resources, water, or oil. Nobody is proposing "we want to expropriate oil and gas and kick out all foreign companies" but rather "we want to be included in the profits from these resources."

And in fact, the measures we've taken-nationalization of hydrocarbons that didn't expropriate fixed assets but recuperated the property and decision-making capacity over gas and petroleum-demonstrate the society's and the government's strategy.

The key for privileged sectors resides not in looking to the future in one year, but to see the future in 10, 20, or 30, or 50 years. This strategic point of view is what could help this process of redistribution of wealth and lead to a coming together, but in a more balanced way and not with the scandalous distances in terms of property and money that we still see in Bolivia.

LC: There has been talk of a growing political and social polarization in the country. Do you agree with this assessment of the present moment?

AGL: Ethnic, class, and regional differences in Bolivia are not recent, they didn't appear this year or even in the last five or 10 years. They run throughout our entire history as a republic.

The novelty today is that for the first time the society is forced to look at itself in the mirror, and it has to see its limitations, its cracks, its weaknesses. Exclusion and confrontation have been recurrent throughout our history-there have been uprisings, massacres in the Bolivian society every 10, 15 years. The ethnic, cultural, and regional differences in our Bolivian society, today visible all at once, are not recent products. They are old wounds that have been present in our history and were never healed, fissures whose resolution was always avoided and that now have appeared simultaneously. Now it's up to this generation-I'm not saying "this government"-to this generation, to this society-to resolve issues that couldn't be resolved in 182 years of political life as an independent republic.

There's no reason to be afraid of these tensions because they're tensions that we've experienced before. The real problem would be if we didn't resolve them, if we just did what past governments have done and swept them under the rug.

Because this is the historic opportunity for society to be sincere with itself; it's the opportunity for a rebirth of its collective spirit based on who we really are, and not the illusion of who we want to be, as the elites have always imposed before in this country.

LC: Given the divisions, do you still think it's feasible to agree on a new constitution with major changes, or will it be necessary to accept more minor reforms?

AGL: The Constituent Assembly is conceived of to create an institutional order that corresponds to the reality of who we are. Up to now, every one of the 17-18 previous constitutions has tried to copy the latest institutional fashion-French, U.S., European. And it was clear that it didn't fit us, because these institutions correspond to other societies. We are indigenous and non-indigenous, we are modern and traditional, we are liberal and communitarist, we are a profoundly diverse society regionally and a hybrid in terms of social classes. So we have to have institutions that allow us to recognize that pluralism.

This is the great challenge of the Constituent Assembly. And that's why we are confident that it will meet its goals, in spite of the difficulties, with this idea of expressing the real society and projecting that in institutional and normative terms for the coming decades.

LC: You have spoken of diversity not only in terms of the need to recognize it in a new form of institutionality but also as the guiding principle of a new social pact. Reading the newspapers these days, diversity seems to be more a factor of division. How do you move toward this vision of strength through diversity?

AGL: Sometimes the press focuses the cameras only on the differences. Then you see a country that appears to be on the verge of a breakdown because all actors want to assert their own identities and differences at the same time.

We've always been divided. It's just that now we're seeing ourselves with all our divisions and tendencies. The illusion of a monolithic, cohesive unity has broken like a glass thrown to the ground. And it can never be put back together. We can't go back to living with illusions.

The key for all the groups is to affirm their difference, but at the same time produce a will to unity-to an agreed-on unity, not an imposed or merely superficial unity. Sure, at first it's scary, as everyone begins to wake up to the fact that they are different from the other, and to assume that difference and not to hide it. But that's the first step in building real unity.

The second step is, based on the affirmation of differences, to affirm what we have in common. Without a doubt, the indigenous and peasant movements have been the most lucid in taking these steps. To give you an example: it would be very easy for the indigenous and peasant movement to demand the right of each community, each culture, each nationality to the control and ownership of natural resources. Even the UN declaration recognizes that right-to land, forests, gas, and oil.

But what you see is that at the same time as they affirm their diversity, they are also asserting unity when they say "we have to nationalize hydrocarbons" in the sense of a collective "I" that is above the particular language, culture, or region. The proposal to nationalize gas and oil didn't come from intellectuals or from the middle classes. It came out of the popular movements, mostly indigenous and peasant movements. So the sector that most affirms its difference is the one that also affirms the principle of unity around a material collective "I." Not a fictitious one, not just symbols and rites, but in real actions: the assembly, nationalization of hydrocarbons, and redistribution of wealth.

LC: You mention the responsibility of social movements. Other progressive governments, brought to power by grassroots movements, have been criticized for subsequently sidelining those movements. How do you conceive the role of social movements in the Morales government?

AGL: We consider this to be a government of social movements. Even though that means there are tensions, because government and state are by definition a process of centralization of decisions and, by definition, a social movement is a process of socialization and collective diffusion of decision-making. What's interesting is to ride on that tension. That's the novelty of the process.

You'll ask: But how do you back up this claim to be a government of social movements? On four levels, from the most general to the most specific.

The most general: the program of changes and transformations in the government is the program proposed by grassroots mobilizations over the last 15 years. What the government of President Morales has done is to practically transcribe into decree or law what was collectively developed by society itself through social movements. Land, hydrocarbons, Constituent Assembly, the issue of autonomies, redistribution of wealth, process of industrialization, and so many things still pending-all the big decisions of this government have been historically proposed over the past 10 years by the social movements.

The second level is that for the government's major decisions-all of them, without exception-we've consulted with the leadership of the different social movements. There isn't one important measure that isn't marked by a process of feedback and consultation with these sectors, because every one of these actions can only be sustained through mobilization of society, not through a bureaucratic action.

Third, in the government's structure, you'll find the presence of a good part of the leadership of the social movements. Whether as mayors, prefects (the provincial leadership), parliamentary representatives, constituent assemblypersons, ministers, there's a practical, physical presence of grassroots leadership in government. To what degree they maintain their connection to their constituents is a different problem. To what degree they could become bureaucratized, is definitely a risk. But if you watch the parliament on television or the assembly, you see an enormous presence of these sectors. This is something that was unthinkable five or 10 years ago, because these were positions reserved for certain families, for elites cultivated in foreign universities, with famous last names, and a tradition of being in politics.

Fourth, although the social movement itself can't move into government administration, the selection of government officials must meet not only criteria of merit but also approval from social movements and organizations. Here it's equally valid to have a masters or doctorate from Harvard as to have links with the peasant federation. Yes, this can slow up certain areas of government efficiency but it's a sign of the times.

LC: The last question: You and the president come from a background of participation in movements. What are the big surprises or unexpected challenges of coming to government?

AGL: There's clearly a leap between the logic of mobilization and protest, to the logic of administration. However, the Movement toward Socialism (MAS) as a coalition of social organizations has experienced a learning curve and transition from strictly making demands and being a union movement, to increasingly becoming a revolutionary political entity. This started 10 years ago when the unions began to control local governments. The agrarian unions entered the mayorships and had to put to test their demands with transparency. Its not a lot of time, many parties have to spend 30 years preparing for governing. In our case, there were 10 years of training-too fast.

But for better or worse, you have there a first period of gestation of political leaders who had to combine the discourse of mobilization with the ability to govern. These leaders who were trained since the 90s in local government, several of them are now in parliament and even Vice Ministers.

Also, this social movement matures very quickly starting in about 2000, moving from confrontational strategies to proposing designs for the nation. It isn't usual, even in the history of Bolivia, to see this kind of political maturation. Increasingly in the mobilizations and protests the issues that you go to dialogue with the government are no longer "how can I get something for my sector?" but "how can I change Bolivia?" The Constituent Assembly emerged as a grassroots demand in 2000, recuperation of the hydrocarbon sector since 2003, a new law on land since 1999-there were already well-developed general guidelines for defining public goods.

Although there have been difficulties, which we've admitted publicly, it still is remarkable what we've achieved with these decisions: economic growth, modification of the economic structure of society, and implementation-albeit gradual-of some things at the social level.

I believe it's a healthy process and full of vitality, and has good possibilities of success.